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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR THE PEACEFUL
USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY UNDER THE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
By RAM KRISHNA DIXIT *
INTRODUCTION
0 NE OF THE main objects of the Atomic Energy Act of 19541 is to expand
the United States' cooperation with friendly nations in certain atomic
energy matters. Representative Cole, the chairman of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, in referring to the President's message, stated that:
"The message did recommend that the following objectives be sought
through amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 at this time:
"First, widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic energy
matters;
"Second, improved procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic
energy information; and
"Third, encouragement of broadened participation in the development
of peacetime uses of atomic energy in the United States.
"These are the basic objectives sought in the two bills before us." 2
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, known as the McMahon Act,8 imposed
stringent limitations, with penalties, on international activities. The export of
goods including fissionable material, services or exchange of information relat-
ing to Atomic energy was prohibited. Only the export of certain component
parts of reactor facilities, of source materials and of radioisotopes was permitted
under license." The McMahon Act prohibited any person from engaging "di-
rectly or indirectly-in the production of any fissionable material outside the
United States." 1 The words "directly and indirectly" are so vague and suscepti-
ble of very wide interpretation that doubts were raised as to whether lecturing
and teaching abroad were covered by the Act. The Act did not make any dis-
tinction between friendly and unfriendly nations for this purpose.
* B.A., 1949, and LL.B., 1951, Agra University, India; LL.M., 1955, Harvard; candidate for
S.J.D. at Northwestern University; admitted to practice under jurisdiction of Madhya Bharat High
Court, India, and registered to practice in Gwalior District at Lashkar; Teaching Associate at
Northwestern University, 1956-1957; former compiler of statutes and ordinances for Madhya Bharat
Law Journal; specialist in international law and comparative constitutional law.
168 STAT. 919 (1954).
2 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 3323 and H. R. 8862 to Amend
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-3 (1954).
8 79th Cong., P.L. 585, ch. 724.
4 Id. at §§ 5, 7, and 10.
5 Section 5(3) (c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
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But as the years passed it was soon realized that the United States alone
did not have the monopoly of atomic weapons. The Secretary of State, Mr.
Dulles, emphasized this point clearly in his testimony before the Joint committee
on Atomic energy:'
"In 1946 it seemed that, subject to possible internationalization, total
secrecy would best serve the interests of our nation and of all humanity. Since
1946 such monopoly as we had has ended. To some extent that was due to
treachery and treason. But we would be foolish not to rate highly the scientific
capabilities of the Soviet Society . . that our potential enemies have a knowl-
edge vastly superior to that of most of the nations which we count as friends.
"This is an unhealthy state of affairs. It means that the present very strict
secrecy requirements of the 1946 Act no longer represent the wisest interna-
tional policy. We need to assert leadership in turning atomic energy to the
peaceful service of mankind. . . Also we need to equip our Allies with
the knowledge which will enable them to counter the kind of atomic warfare
which we know the communist forces are equipped to wage.
"The pending bills would serve these foreign policy objectives."
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 seeks to achieve the above-mentioned
objectives. The Act provides for the negotiation of bilateral agreements with
foreign nations in the area of peace-time uses of atomic energy under carefully
stipulated guarantees and safeguards. The related provision, Section 123,
entitled, "Cooperation with other Nations", provides as follows:
"No cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization pur-
suant to sections 54, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104 or 144 shall be undertaken until-
"a. the commission, or, in the case of agreements for cooperation arranged
pursuant to subsection 144, the department of Defense has submitted
to the President the proposed agreement for cooperation, together
with its recommendation thereon, which proposed agreement shall
include (1) the terms, conditions, duration, nature and scope of the
cooperation; a guarantee by the cooperating party that security safe-
guards and standards as set forth in the agreement for cooperation
will 'be maintained; (3) a guaranty by the cooperating party, that
any material to be transferred pursuant to such agreement will not be
used for atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose; and (4)
a guaranty by the cooperating party that any material or any restricted
data to be transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will
not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction
of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for co-
operation;
"b. the President has approved and authorized the execution of the pro-
posed agreement for cooperation, and has made a determination in
writing that the performance of the proposed agreement will pro-
C Hearings, supra note 2, Part II of two parts at 684.
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mote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common
defense and security; and
1c. the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the approval
and the determination of the President, has been submitted to the
joint committee and a period of thirty days has elapsed while Con-
gress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be
excluded the days on which either house is not in session because of
an adjournment of more than three days)." 6a
For the purposes of discussion different aspects of this section shall be
taken one by one.
THE PROCEDURE To ENTER INTO BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
According to Section 123 no agreement for cooperation shall be entertained
until the commission has submitted to the president the proposed agreement
for cooperation together with its recommendation. It does not appear from this
section or from any other provision of the Act who is primarily responsible for
the initiation of these agreements. In the light of other provisions of the Act
where the commission has been expressly authorized to do certain things this
language creates confusion. For example, Section 53(a) provides that "the
commission is authorized to issue licenses . . ."; and in Sections 55, 63, 67,
etc., where the commission has authority to do certain things, affirmative lan-
guage to the same effect has been used. Even in Sections 54, 64, 82, and 104,
where the commission has been given the authority to cooperate with other
nations in different aspects of the Atomic Energy Program, this affirmative
language has been used. For example, Section 82 (a) states:
"The commission is authorized to cooperate with any nation by distribut-
ing by-product material .... "
On the contrary Section 123 starts with a negative statement:
"No cooperation with any nation or regional defense organization pur-
suant to sections 54, 57, 64, 82, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until-
(a) The commission . . . has submitted to the President the proposed
agreement for cooperation together with its recommendations there-
on.. .
Thus it may be inferred or interpreted that the State Department, or any
other officer of the government, a senator or a representative may submit a
draft of the proposed agreement to the commission and then the commission
shall submit to the president the proposed agreement for cooperation together
with its recommendation. Two things are clear: first, the commission should
submit to the president the proposed agreement for cooperation; secondly, the
oa Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 939 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2152 (1956).
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commission should submit it together with its recommendation. But this
language does not exclude the inference that in origin any government agency
or member of congress or any citizen may suggest and propose to the commission
to undertake cooperative agreement with a foreign nation.
While in the course of hearings Representative Durham, referring to sec-
tions 122 and 123, asked the Secretary of State during his testimony:
"You do not refer so much to the provision of the law which primarily
you are speaking to or which primarily you will be interested in, or your agency
which you head will have to perform and carry out these agreements, and that
is in Section 122 and Section 123 ...
"SECRETARY DULLES: I think we can get along all right with these pro-
visions as they are now drafted, Congressman." 7
The United States has entered into bilateral agreements for cooperation
with twenty-seven foreign nations, and they have been signed on behalf of the
United States by some officer of the State Department and the chairman of
the commission concurrently; the signature of the officer of the Department
of State appears first. It is not objected as to who signs first; rather, the ob-
jection is to the law which is not clear on the subject. Unless authorized
otherwise in some special cases, the usual practice is that the Department of
State enters into such agreements with foreign nations on behalf of the United
States. There is no doubt that all these agreements are entered into on behalf
of the government of the United States, but somebody is supposed to be re-
sponsible for their conclusion. In almost all agreements except in the case
of agreements with the United Kingdom and Belgium the words used are
as follows:
"Whereas the Government of the United States of America represented by
the United States Atomic Energy Commission" . . .8
But in the agreements with the United Kingdom and Belgium language to that
effect does not appear, and the inference may be drawn that the State Depart-
ment is the representative of the United States in these agreements. Thus it is
not clear what the relationship of the State Department and the commission
is so far as these agreements are concerned. It is accepted that the State
Department is the best judge in foreign matters, but its position should have
been brought into the light, like the Department of Defense, in the Act.
The cooperation is supposed to be undertaken pursuant to Sections 54, 57,
64, 82, 103, 104 or 144 of the Act. These sections specifically authorize the
T Hearings, supra note 2, Part II of two parts at 690-69 1.
8 Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey, Department of State Publication
5968; Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3320, p. 1.
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commission to do or not to do certain things for cooperation purposes with
foreign nations. Sections 54, 64, and 82 authorize the distribution of special
nuclear material, the source material and the byproduct material respectively by
the commission to any nation that is a party to the agreement for cooperation.
Likewise, Section 103 authorizes the issuance of commercial licenses for utiliza-
tion facilities for use in medical therapy and research and development. Section
57 is a prohibitory clause. It makes it unlawful for any person to possess or
transfer any special nuclear material and to transfer or receive any special
nuclear material in interstate commerce except as authorized by the commission
pursuant to subsection 53(a). Furthermore, this section also prohibits en-
gaging directly or indirectly in the production of any special nuclear material
outside of the United States except under an agreement for cooperation made
pursuant to Section 123, or upon authorization by the commission after a deter-
mination that such activity will not be inimical to the interest of the United
States. Clause (b) of Section 57 provides that the commission shall not
distribute any special nuclear material to any person for a use which is not
under the jurisdiction of the United States except pursuant to Section 54, or to
any person within the United States if the commission finds that it would be
"inimical to the common defense and security." Section 144 provides that the
president may authorize the commission to communicate to the cooperating
nation Restricted Data regarding certain matters as provided in the Act. a The
president may also authorize the Department of Defense to communicate Re-
stricted Data for certain purposes.b But no such cooperation shall involve
the communication of Restricted Data relating to the design or fabrication of
atomic weapons.
THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT
Section 123 contains carefully drawn conditions according to which the
agreements for cooperation may be entered into. The drafters of the bill were
very careful not to leave the conclusion of the agreements solely at the pleasure
of the parties. The Act specifically provides that the proposed agreement shall
include "the terms, conditions, duration, nature, and scope of the cooperation."
8a Section 144a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, supra note 1, includes the following:
"(1) refining, purification, and subsequent treatment of source material;
(2) reactor development;
(3) production of special nuclear material;
(4) health and safety;
(5) industrial and other applications of atomic energy for peaceful uses; and
(6) research and development to the foregoing."
8b "(1) the development of defense plans;
(2) the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons; and
(3) the evaluation of capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic
weapons."
Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, supra note 1.
1956.]
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These bilateral agreements for cooperation have been concluded with twenty-
seven nations " and it will be appropriate to examine them in the light of the
above-mentioned conditions.
It must be said at the outset that agreements with twenty-four countries
are to a great extent identical in their scope; hence the agreement with Turkey
will henceforth be referred to as an example for these twenty-four countries un-
less something otherwise appears in other agreements. Agreements with
Canada, the United Kingdom and Belgium are more elaborate because of the
special relations existing with these countries and need separate discussion.
These will be referred to only at appropriate places. All these agreements are
entitled "Agreements for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy." Thus it is clear that these agreements are for civil uses and not for
military uses. The chief aim of these agreements is cooperation in atomic
energy research for peaceful and humanitarian uses. The agreements provide
for exchange of information between the parties. The agreements with twenty-
four nations provide that the parties will exchange information in the following
fields:
"A. Design, construction and operation of research reactors10 and their
use as research development and engineering tools and in medical therapy.
"B. Health and Safety problems related to the operation and use of re-
search reactors.
"C. The use of radio-active isotopes in physical and biological research,
medical therapy, agriculture and industry." 11
But "Restricted Data" shall not be communicated under this agreement. The
agreement provides:
"Restricted data shall not be communicated under this Agreement and no
materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred and no services shall
be furnished under this agreement if the transfer of any such materials or
equipment and devices or the furnishing of any such services involves the com-
munication of Restricted data." 12
9 Turkey, Colombia, Brazil, Israel, Spain, Philippines, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Argentina,
Lebanon, China, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Venezuela, Chile, Japan, Pakistan, Uruguay,
Peru, Korea, Sweden, Thailand. More elaborate agreements have been entered into with Canada,
Belgium, and the United Kingdom.
10 The term "research reactor" has been defined as follows: "C. Research reactor means a
reactor which is designed for the production of neutrons and other radiations for general research
and development purposes, medical therapy, or training in nuclear science and engineering. The
term does not cover power reactors, power demonstration reactors, or reactors designed primarily
for the production of special nuclear materials." Agreement with Turkey, Article X.
11 Article I, Agreement with Turkey.
12 Article V, Agreement with Turkey. The Act defines "Restricted Data" as follows: "Section
11 . . . r. The term 'Restricted Data' means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utiliza-
tion of Atomic weapons ; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from
the restricted data category pursuant to Section 142."
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It seems clear from the above provisions that data which touch the military
aspect fall out of the sphere of exchange of information. The design and
manufacture of atomic weapons are highly technical, and the mere production
of special nuclear material does not necessarily lead to the manufacture of
weapons, but even this subject falls out of the category of exchange of informa-
tion. It is not clear whether classified information will be exchanged or not.
Nothing is said expressly about it. The presumption might be that since only
restricted data, expressly mentioned in the agreement, shall not be communi-
cated, that classified information might be exchanged ("Classified" information
is the lowest category of security classification). But in the agreements with
Belgium,"3 Canada ", and the United Kingdom, "' it has been expressly said that
classified information will be exchanged and this express mention in other
agreements might take away the above presumption.
THE SUPPLY OF URANIUM AND OTHER MATERIALS
The commission will lease uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 as may
be required as initial and replacement fuel in the operation of research reactors,
but the quantity of such uranium shall not at any time be in excess of six (6)
kilograms unless the commission specifically determines otherwise. The ura-
nium will also be leased to individuals or private organizations for the operation
of reactors as are authorized by the various governments within their jurisdic-
tions "in consultation with the commission . . . provided the government
shall . . . at all times maintain sufficient control of the material and the
operation of the reactor to enable the government . . . to comply with the pro-
visions of this Agreement and the applicable provisions of the lease arrange-
ment."
The words "in consultation with the commission" make it obligatory on
the cooperating nation to consult the commission if it decides to authorize
private individuals or private organizations to operate reactors. The question
arises what will happen if the commission does not agree in a particular
authorization case? One might argue that virtually the commission might
dictate the standards for authorization to private individuals. This provision
seems to go too far and seems to interfere in the internal matters of a state.
It may be argued that atomic energy is a highly technical matter and that it
is the interest of the commission that such precious material (U-235) should
not be wasted but should be utilized for the maximum advantage of the lessee
13 Article III C 2(a) and (b), Agreement with Belgium, Department of State Press Release,
June 20, 1955.
1 Article 1I, Agreement with Canada, Department of State Press Release, June 20, 1955.
15 Article II, Agreement with the United Kingdom concerning the civil uses of atomic energy,
Department of State Press Release, June 20, 1955.
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state. Furthermore, the commission is the best judge in these matters and
shall give valuable advice to the government after judging the technical strength
of an organization or of a person as it is its usual -business in the United States.
No doubt it is true to a great extent at present, but the above words do not
prevent the commission from exerting its political influence. Let it be assumed
for the sake of argument that an organization, which imports material and
technical assistance to construct and operate a reactor from a communist country
which has trade relations with the cooperating nation, might not get the favor-
able opinion of the commission, but the cooperating nation considers it fit to
authorize the organization to construct and operate a reactor and to utilize
U-235 leased by the commission. Can the commission prevent the use of U-235
by such authorized private individuals or private organizations? The language,
"provided the government . . . shall at all times maintain sufficient control
of the material and the operation of the reactor to enable the government to
comply with the provisions of this agreement and the applicable provisions
of the lease arrangement," 16 does not warrant this presumption. It is the
government that is responsible for its use, and the agreement seeks it through
the control by the cooperating state of the material and the operation of the
reactor.
The agreement further provides for the replacement of the fuel elements.
The fuel elements containing U-235 leased by the commission "shall be returned
to the commission and, except as may be agreed, the form and content of the
irradiated fuel elements shall not be altered after their removal from the reactor
and prior to delivery to the commission." 1'
The lease of the uranium shall be on such terms and conditions as may
be mutually agreed.
The agreement further provides for the sale or lease of such reactor
materials by the commission as are not obtainable on the commercial market
but are needed for the operation of the reactors, upon the terms mutually
agreed by the parties. 8
ROLE OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY
It need not be emphasized that to broaden the scope of private enterprise
was also one of the reasons for amending the McMahon Act. This object has
been fully kept in mind while making agreements. Accordingly, private indi-
viduals and private organizations may deal directly with the private individuals
16 Article II A, Agreement with Turkey.
17 Article II C, Agreement with Turkey.
i Id., Article III.
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and organizations of other countries. The government of the United States,
with respect to the subjects of agreed exchange of information referred to in
Article I of the Agreements, will permit persons under its jurisdiction to per-
form services and transfer and export materials either to the cooperating state
or to private individuals who are authorized by it. But there are two limitations.
First are the limitations set forth in Article V, that restricted data shall not be
communicated; secondly, the performance of services and the transfer and
export of materials shall be subject to the applicable laws, regulations and
license requirements of both governments."9
This provision is consistent with the commission's policy expressed as
follows during the joint committee hearings:
"It is contemplated that with respect to the furnishing of equipment fa-
cilities and materials (other than special nuclear materials) United States indus-
try will play a major role in implementing agreements for cooperation.
"As permitted 'by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it is the intention of
the Commission that all agreements for cooperation with other governments
shall provide for industry to supply equipment, facilities, services, and materials
(other than special nuclear materials) to the extent that such activities shall
fall within the scope of the particular agreement.
"Under the Act a license issued by the Commission is required for the
export of production facilities, utilization facilities, source materials and by-
product materials. The Commission is now formulating licensing regulations
and in discharging its licensing functions under these regulations, the Com-
mission will be guided by the principle of facilitating industry's participation
in the arrangements for cooperation with other governments to the fullest
extent permitted by the act." 20
The chairman of the Joint Committee, Representative Cole, has also described
the procedure for the exportation of facilities as follows:
"It was intended that these Sections operate as follows: The United
States might enter into an agreement for cooperation with another nation,
requiring the export to that nation of, for instance, a reactor. The firm in this
country from whom that nation desires to purchase the reactor must then ob-
tain a license to export that reactor pursuant to the terms of the agreement and
rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.
"I see no undue complications in this method of procedure. The rights
of the exporter within this country are established by rules and regulations.
The rights of the importer within the country receiving the facilities are, of
course, to be determined by the laws of that country. Both are subject to the
terms of the agreement for cooperation." 21
19 Article IV, Agreement with Turkey.
20 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., First Session on De-
velopment, Growth and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, Part I of three parts, pp. 208-209.
21 Cole, Regulating International Nuclear Activities, 13 NuCLEONics, No. 3, March, 1955.
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The A.E.C. has issued a general authorization under which Americans may
engage in unclassified foreign atomic energy activities without prior commission
approval when the activity does not involve classified information. This au-
thorization makes an exception in the case of those countries and areas listed
as sub-group A countries or destinations in Section 371.3 of the Comprehensive
Export Schedule of the Department of Commerce.22 A prior agreement for
cooperation is not required in the above case. But the classified activities still
require that a bilateral agreement be in force." It was doubted whether the
commission had the authority to make a general statement rather than a par-
ticular finding in each case. General Counsel to the A.E.C. has advised the
commission that it does have the authority that is exercised in this action.
DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT
The agreement with Turkey is for ten years and is subject to renewal as
may be mutually agreed. " The agreements with other nations are for five
years and are subject to renewal.2" It is hoped and expected that "this initial
agreement for cooperation will lead to consideration of further cooperation
extending to the design, construction, and operation of power producing reac-
tors. Accordingly, the parties will consult with each other from time to time
concerning the feasibility of an additional Agreement for cooperation with
respect to the production of power from Atomic Energy .. .,.11 It should be
noted that the definition of research reactor which has been put in the agreement
does hot cover-power reactor.
The agreement further provides that "At the expiration of this Agreement
or any extension thereof the government . . . shall deliver to the United States
all fuel elements containing reactor fuels leased by the Commission and any
other fuel material leased by the Commission. Such fuel elements and such
fuel materials shall be delivered to the commission at a site in the United States
designated by the Commission at the expense of the government . . .and such
delivery shall be made under appropriate safeguards against radiation hazards
while in transit." 27a
SAFEGUARDS
In connection with safeguards the cooperating state, according to agree-
ment, agrees to maintain proper safeguards so as to assure the proper use and
safekeeping of uranium U-235 and other reactor materials including equipment
22 United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Release, Monday, October 3, 1955.
23 United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Conference, October 3, 1955.
24 Ibid,
25 Article VIII, Agreement with Turkey.
26 All other nations except Canada, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. See note 9 supra.
27 Ibid.
27a Article VIII, Agreement with Turkey.
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and devices and further agrees that they shall be used solely for the design,• I
construction and operation of research reactors, except as may be agreed other-
wise.28
MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS AND REPORTS
The agreement also provides on the part of the cooperating state:
11.. . to maintain records relating to power levels of operation and burning
of reactor fuels and to make annual reports to the commission on these sub-
jects. If the commission requests, the government . . . will permit commis-
sion representatives to observe from time to time the condition and use of
any leased material and to observe the performance of the reactor in which
the material is used." 29
GUARANTY PROVISIONS
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides that guaranty provisions should
be put into the agreements. These guaranties should provide that:
"Security safeguards and standards as set forth in the agreement will be
maintained; . . . that any material to be transferred pursuant to such agree-
ment will not be used for atomic weapons, or for research or development of
atomic weapons or for any other military purpose; and . . . that any material
or any Restricted data to be transferred pursuant to the agreement for coop-
eration will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the juris-
diction of the cooperating party, except as specified in the agreement for
cooperation." 20
These are the statutory conditions which should be complied with. Hence
the provisions to this effect have been incorporated into various agreements.
Article VII of the agreement begins with the heading "Guaranties Pre-
scribed by the U. S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954" and provides as follows:
"The government . . . guarantees that:
"A. Safeguards provided in Article VI shall be maintained.
"B. No materials, including equipment and devices, transferred to the
government . . . or authorized persons under its jurisdiction, pursuant to this
Agreement, by lease, sale or otherwise will be used for atomic weapons or for
any other military purposes, and that no such material . . . will be trans-
ferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction . . . except as the
commission may agree to such transfer to another nation and then only if in
the opinion of the commission such transfer falls within the scope of an agree-
ment for cooperation between the United States and the other nation." 8oa
28 Article VI, A and B, Agreement with Turkey.
29 Id., Article VI C.
80 Section 123a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, note 1 fupra.
soa Article VII, Agreement with Turkey.
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The above provision is more or less a repetition of the safeguards men-
tioned in Article VI, paragraphs A and B, of the agreement with a guaranty
by the cooperating nation. Its main purpose is to emphasize that the materials
should not be used for any other purpose except as provided in the agreement
or in subsequent agreements as are agreed between the parties. The cooperat-
ing nation also agrees not to transfer to unauthorized persons or beyond the
jurisdiction. Such transfer is possible to another nation if in the opinion of
the commission such transfer falls within the scope of an agreement for co-
operation between the United States and the other nation.
The next step required by the Act is that the president should approve
and authorize the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation and
should make a determination in writing that the performance of the proposed
agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the
common defense and security. 1 The determination has two characteristics,
one positive and the other negative. The determination that "the proposed
agreement will promote" is positive; and the determination, "will not con-
stitute an unreasonable risk," is negative in its aspect. The question might
arise how an agreement determined to promote the common defense and
security will constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and se-
curity? Either the positive determination is wrong or the making of the negative
determination is futile and unnecessary. It may be further argued that the
negative determination is a logical conclusion of the first determination, but
in answer to the above arguments it is submitted that the fact seems to be that
these two determinations are two different aspects of the same thing. It is
submitted that every agreement in such a strategic field is a risk in which,
according to the relation of the party, some classified or restricted data might
be communicated. It should be noted that this provision is also applicable to
agreements like those with the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Canada, which
are quite extensive and complicated and contemplate the communication of
classified and restricted data. Thus in these cases, though it is determined
that these agreements will promote the common defense and security, it does not
necessarily mean that they might not promote the common defense and security.
Nobody can forecast the future. To provide for these circumstances the presi-
dent should determine that the proposed agreement will not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. It appears that it has
been assumed that there is always some risk in these agreements as the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy has properly remarked in its report that:
"Almost any cooperation with any foreign country can be said to involve




visions incorporated in Section 123 are designed to permit cooperation where,
upon weighing those risks in the light of the safeguards provided, there is
found to be no unreasonable risk to the common defense and security in per-
mitting the cooperation." 32
This provision is applicable to all kinds of agreements. But in the case of
agreements which provide only for research reactors, this kind of determination
seems merely a formality.
As has been said above, the commission should submit the proposed
agreement together with its recommendation to the president. This means that
recommendation by the commission is necessary before it can be submitted to
the president. Originally, the House Bill provided only for submission to the
president by the commission, but "the Senate amendment required in addition
that the Commission or the Department of Defense favorably recommend the
agreement for cooperation." 3 Doubts were raised that this provision sub-
ordinates the authority of the president to the will of the commission.
Representatives Holifield and Price, members of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, expressed their views jointly on this point as follows:
"The President cannot make any such agreement unless it is approved
by the Atomic Energy Commission. . . . Note that the Antomic Energy Com-
mission is an independent agency whose members serve, not at the pleasure of
the President, but for a fixed statutory term.
"We seriously question the subordination of the President's authority in
the conduct of foreign affairs to the judgment of officials who may not be
in a position to weigh the importance of countervailing risks as is the President.
• . . In place of requiring the consent of the Atomic Energy Commission
or the Department of Defense, we would prefer merely that the President, be-
fore making an agreement, be required to obtain a statement from the Commis-
sion or the Department of Defense as to the desirability and sufficiency of the
agreement in respect to the matters referred to in Section 123a." 34
There might seem to be partial truth in the above argument, but it does
not seem that the power of the president has been really restricted in any way.
The president has broad authority to negotiate treaties under the Constitution
in case such an assumed situation arises. Secondly, for the successful carrying
out of these agreements the cooperation of the commission is necessary since
the commission is in charge of all the Atomic Energy Program. It will be the
commission who will carry out the agreement by furnishing information, tech-
nical assistance and materials.
32 Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
As Amended, and for Other Purposes, S. REp. No. 1699, p. 22.
33 Conference Reports, Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House to the Bill H.R.
9757. Marks and Trowbridge, Framework for Atomic Industry D-3.
34 Op. cit. supra note 32 at p. 135.
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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The third step toward the conclusion of these agreements is that:
"Sec. 123. C. the proposed agreement for cooperation, together with the
approval and the determination of the President, has been submitted to the
joint Committee and a period of thirty days has elapsed while Congress is in
session .... " s5
"The requirement essentially is for informational purposes, as agreements
for cooperation do not require congressional approval and the joint committee
has no power to approve or disapprove." " If the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy does not like the proposed agreement for cooperation, then the only
thing which the committee can do is to bring the matter to the floor of the
congress in the form of a resolution.
Further, it is important to notice that Section 123 authorizes only bilateral
agreements for cooperation; that is to say, the statute does not authorize the
president to enter into agreements for cooperation with a group of nations or
with an international agency unless, as specified in Section 124, an international
agreement has previously been entered into with a group of nations. This
means that the president must negotiate a treaty or an executive agreement
before he can cooperate with a group of nations.
The argument against multilateral agreements seems to be based on the
idea that national security would be in greater jeopardy in dealing with a
"group of nations" as against dealing with one nation separately. But it seems
difficult to reconcile this distinction, and it is an unwarranted and unreasonable
restriction.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES UNDER THE AGREEMENTS
At present most of the international agreements are carefully drawn and
provide the machinery for the settlement of disputes or misunderstandings
which might arise in the future. These agreements which relate to a very
important matter do not mention anything about the settlement of future dis-
putes. One may doubt whether these agreements are of such a nature that
no dispute would arise in the future, or whether it is the intention of the
parties that they should be settled by conventional methods, i.e., diplomatic
channels. The suggested answer is that the essence of agreements for cooper-
ation on atomic energy matters is the desire of the cooperating governments
to work together for the attainment of mutual objectives. It would appear,
therefore, that discussion through diplomatic channels offers an appropriate
means of dealing with disputes or misunderstandings which might arise in the
future.
35 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, note 1 supra.
36 Remarks by Edward Diamond, Deputy General Counsel, United States Atomic Energy Com-




In conclusion it would be reasonable to say that the Act provides enough
scope for cooperation with foreign nations in the area of peacetime uses of
atomic energy. It is but natural that the scope of cooperation will differ
according to the relation of the cooperating party with the United States, but
this does not mean that the commission and the president lack power for more
detailed and complicated agreements. It has been argued that the conditions
stipulated in Section 123 are very stringent and complicate the whole matter.
It has also been argued that "it would be utterly unrealistic to suppose that
Soviet Russia could ever comply with the security and other requirements laid
down in Section 123." "' But these arguments neglect the present and look to
the supposed future. First, atomic energy is still a hidden secret and much
has to be done before something could be said with certainty; second, it is a
quite well known fact that Russia is also advanced technically in atomic energy
matters and naturally will be interested in security safeguards on a mutual
basis. Third, no specific security safeguards and standards have been set forth
in the Act itself; hence the agreement may stipulate reasonable safeguards
on a mutual basis. The president has the broad powers under the Constitution
to negotiate treaties on any subject with any nation and this provision does not
affect that power in any way. There is no doubt that a series of conditions
have been set forth in the Act, but this provides a procedure to insure that full
consideration is given to the proposed agreement before it is entered into.
Within a short period starting from May 3, 1955, such cooperative agreements
with twenty-seven nations have been concluded.
As has been said above, Section 123 authorizes only bilateral agreements
and not "agreements with a group of nations." This is an unreasonable re-
striction and is based on false assumptions. The inclusion of this provision
would have greatly facilitated the cooperative program.
On the whole there is enough scope under the Act to cooperate with other
nations to advance the peacetime uses of atomic energy. What is needed at
the present time is really the true spirit to carry out the program.
37 Separate views of Representatives Holifield and Price, op. cit. supra note 32 at p. 134.
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